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ABSTRACT 
There are two distinctive issues in marketing of fishermen catch; one is the issue of agent-principal 
relationship due to asymmetric information whereby the agent takes over the function of marketing 
once the catch is landed. There has been allegation that giving of credit is a form of trade that 
benefits the agent who has control over the daily fishermen catch. Another form of marketing strategy 
which I believe have never been investigated before at least in Malaysia or in fishing industry is the 
way by which fishermen catches are brought to the market place. Many studies and analysis found 
that those who have dominant strategy in the market will be affected by the way simultaneous or 
sequential, collusive or non-collusive marketing strategies. This study is intended to verify the 
theoretical findings of game theory with the empirical evidences using real world data from fisheries 
statistics.    
Keywords: game theory, simultaneous, sequential, collusive and non-collusive strategies.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Small-scale capture, as a traditional fishing activity and its trade have been passed down from 
the earlier generation of fishermen to the current generation with endless social, economic 
and resource management issues. It began with the socio-economic problem of poverty 
among the fishermen community during the 1950s and 1960s. Just after independence the 
blame was on low adoption of fishing technology which unable them to obtain higher 
productivity. However, the nature of problem that has been evolved around the fishermen’s 
productivity and poverty later around 1980s and 1990s shifted to resource management. 
Fisheries have been in open-access for a long period of time such that a possibility of 
depletion due to over-fishing is most likely. The problem of resource depletion could be a 
major issue since in Malaysia the development of marine fisheries has always overshadowed 
that of inland fisheries and fishing activity has been the livelihood of most fishermen. The 
encroachment of Malaysian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by foreign vessels had worsened 
the issue of resource depletion along the coastal areas which led to a joint venture of Thai-
Malaysian deep sea fishing.  
 
 The above issues revolved around the supply, that is, production and productivity. On 
the demand side Malaysian population is ever-growing calling for more food production, 
especially rice, fish, livestock, poultry and others. As the volume of trade in fish marketing is 
going to persist and becoming more important in the future the involvement of small 
fishermen referring to those operating vessel size below 25 GRT are likely to be marginalized 
in this competitive market by the larger vessel operators of 25 to <40 GRT and 40 to <70 
GRT. Vessel size of 70 metric tons and above is supposed to be the deep sea operators which 
we have not considered in the analysis. The objective of this paper is to investigate how 
marketing strategies--collusive or non-collusive, simultaneous or sequential, can have 
influential impact on the fishermen profitability according to the strategic game theory. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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BACKGROUNDS OF GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION 
 
 
The game theory has developed its application mainly in mathematics since its inception in 
1944 by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Its usage has become more diverse in a 
broad field of academia after John Nash was proclaimed the Noble Price winner 1994 with 
the popular Nash equilibrium strategy. Game theory is a branch of applied economics that 
utilizes mathematics as the tools for analyzing possible strategic options in human 
interactions in diverse academic fields ranging from economics, business, psychology, and 
biology to sociology, politics and philosophy. The purpose of human interactions is seen as a 
way to trade and exchange goods in economics and business that yield benefits to the 
interacting players in terms of utilities or outcomes. These outcomes are generally in the form 
of monetary returns or profits. As rational human being the choice of a decision is made 
strategically to attain best outcome over the opponents just as in the games. The best outcome 
to a particular player is arrived after considering the expectations and the likely actions of the 
other players and vice-versa. When game theory was first developed by John von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgenstern (1944) the application was limited to mathematical outcomes, but 
now the philosophical aspect of it has deepened and generalized to include non-parametric 
analyses.  
 
According to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (revised version March 10, 2006 
pp.2-3), long before the game theory was introduced, Cortez, the Spanish conqueror landed in 
Mexico with a small force to fight a much larger force of Aztecs. Fearing that his troops 
might retreat he ordered the ship which brought them to Mexico to be burned. The decision 
taken by the Cortez and his troops was gallantly regarded by the enemy and demoralized the 
Aztecs. They retreated to the hills giving victory to Cortez without the bloodshed.  
 
Parametric outcomes as in mathematics and statistics are considered less challenging 
and easy to predict relative to non-parametric games. Suppose a person is given the choice to 
cross the bridge from point x to point y; with three options of the least dangerous bridge of 
zero percent risk, followed by one with some degree of risk in terms of steep slopes leading 
to the bridge, and finally the most riskiest bridge due to the presence of deadly threats. It is 
rational to choose the least dangerous bridge to achieve the best outcome based on this 
strictly parametric decision. However, non-parametric games are more difficult to predict 
because the opponents are not passive like those of the deadly threats of steep slopes and 
dangerous animals. The decision is somewhat complicated when the zero risk bridge is 
located a distance away from the starting point with difficult upstream while those risky 
crossings are close by. The game becomes more complicated when the situation of non-
parametric is brought into the picture. Suppose the person is a fugitive irrespective of his 
innocent or guilty as he is being charged by his pursuers. Surely the zero risk bridge is not 
likely the best option. In real world this kind of decision making has to be made rationally 
and strategically. We have to understand the game and the likely strategies chosen by the 
rivals since we may involuntarily become players in an unintended game.                         
 
 The example often cited in game theory is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which was first 
discussed by Albert Turner, in the 1940s (Nicholson 1997). Albert Turner was Nash thesis 
advisor. In Prisoner’s Dilemma two persons were caught for committing a crime but there 
was insufficient evidence to extract a confession. The judge decided to separate them to avoid IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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conspiracy of an answer and read them the penalties; “ if you confess you will be given a 
lighter sentence three years each (3, 3), and if you don’t confess while your friend does you 
will get ten years jail while your friend will be jailed for six months, (10, ½), but if both of 
you don’t confess of committing the crime you will be sentenced to two years jail each, (2, 
2).” The prisoner’s safest decision choice is to confess since if his friend does not confess he 
will get only ½ of a year jail sentence, and if his friend also confesses they will be sentenced 
to 3 years each. Although the decision not to confess carries the least sentence of only 2 years 
it is highly risky (10 years) when his friend chooses otherwise. The decision not to confess is 
the best option to the prisoners but it is certainly not safe.   
 
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma was in fact one of the first responses to the Nash 
equilibrium, referring to John Forbes Nash which shared the 1994 Noble Price with John 
Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten that needs no mention in game theory,  
“…that contributed remarkably to the notion of equilibrium that has been widely 
applied and adopted in economics and other behavioral sciences.” (Holt and Roth 
2004 p.3999).  
However, in the “social dilemmas” the Nash equilibrium would not necessarily be a good 
predictor of behavior if the prisoners are allowed to cooperate (Melvin Dresher and Merrill 
Flood 2005). Nash equilibrium refers to the game in which the non-cooperative player 
decides on a strategy given the decisions of the opponent players.   
 
 The crucial aspect of game theory that help players in making choice of a rational 
decision on a particular strategy depends largely on the availability of information about the 
opponents. In the case of Prisoner’s Dilemma the players are separated and located in 
different cells and each person is supposed to have no information whatsoever about his 
colleague’s strategy. If they have perfect information then their dilemma of making the 
choice would not arise because they can collude to choose not to confess, (2yrs., 2yrs.) 
instead of confessing (3yrs., 3yrs.). If the players knew in advance that his associate had 
chosen confess then his decision to confess would be Nash equilibrium and the solution is the 
second best since both loss one year of a free life outside the prison. The current study is 
basically a parametric decision making which is evaluated at optimal economic outcomes. 
These outcomes are profits to the three categories of vessel operators; the small, medium and 
large fishermen.               
  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In this study we are going to focus our analyses on three different forms of economic aspects 
of game theory namely, the non-collusive strategy, the collusive strategy and sequential 
strategy. The first two marketing or more appropriately the output distribution strategies 
assumed that the players—the fishermen or their sale agents are marketing their catches 
simultaneously. The simultaneous non-collusive mode of distribution which is perhaps the 
common method of marketing of fishermen daily outputs refers to the individual strategy 
whereby they do not cooperate, that is, there is no team work whatsoever between one 
fishermen and the other fishermen in marketing of their daily catches. In contrast to the non-
collusion is the collusive strategy whereby individual fishermen cooperate as in team work in 
the marketing of their products. The objective of game theory in the simultaneous collusive IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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and no-collusive marketing systems is to identify whether or not economic returns to the 
operators under these conditions differ, suppose to be evaluated under an optimal condition. 
 
 The sequential marketing strategy refers to the system of distribution of fishermen’s 
output in chronological order, that is, if there are only two players there will be the first and 
then the second person/fisherman to market their catches. Economists believe that there are 
significant differences of economic returns accrued to the players in each order depending on 
the market domination of these individual operators. Some economists even believe that the 
first mover is always the likely gainer as he/she has the advantage of first hand of market 
information, such as the ability to monopolize the temporary market situation before the 
arrival of the second and succeeding players (Pindyck et al. 2006). We will use data from 
Annual Fisheries Statistics 2004 to test the hypothesis that the first mover is better off then 
the second mover if the second player is non-dominant in this investigation.  
 
Non-collusive simultaneous strategy     
 
In a two-person game, suppose P1 and P2 represent the ex or on shore and the wholesale fish 
prices respectively. Fishermen’s catch for small vessel of less than 25 GRT is represented by 
q1 and the catch of medium size vessel of 25 to less than 40 GRT is represented by q2 then the 
linear interaction functions for non-collusive are given by 
 
  p1 = f1 (q1, q2) =    2 2 1 1 0 q q a a a + +       0 , 0 2 1 — — a a for                                     (1) 
 
  p2 = f2 (q1, q2) =    2 2 1 1 0 q q b b b + +       0 , 0 2 1 — — b b for                                     (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) above are initially derived from the indirect demand functions for small 
vessel catch, p 1 = f(q1, p 2 )  and the medium vessel catch,  p2= g(q2, p 1 )  by simultaneous 
solution technique. This is achieved by substituting the RHS of small vessel demand function 
into the medium vessel demand and vice-versa.  
 
Given the total revenue R(qi), total cost C(qi) and the net return equation ∏(qi)  for 
i=1 and 2, they can be shown as    
 
  R(q1 ) =  f1(q1, q2) q1                                                                                        (3) 
 
  R(q2) =  f2(q1, q2) q2                                                                                         (4) 
 
  ∏(q1)  =  f1(q1, q2) q1 -  C(q)1                                                                          (5) 
   
 ∏ (q2)  =  f2(q1, q2) q2 -  C(q)2                                                                                                              (6) 
 
 
The differentiation of the net return with respect to the outputs; q 1 and q 2 and setting the 
results equal to zero the vessel’s reaction functions are obtained and should be equal to the 
following: 
 
  q1     =    
1
2
1
0
2 2 a
a
a
a
- q2                                                                                                                              (7) 
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  q2       =      
2
1
2
0
2 2 b
b
b
b
- q1                                                                                                                   (8) 
 
Substituting the right-hand side of q2 in (8) into (7) and solving for q1 the catch for the non-
collusive optimal quantity of small vessel can be subsequently estimated, and substituting the 
result of optimal q2
* into equation (8)  q1
* is obtained. These optimal catches of small vessel 
(q1
*) and medium vessel (q2
*) first should be used to estimate the efficient prices offered by 
the small vessel and the medium vessel of equations (1) and (2) above.    
 
 The non-collusive net economic returns for the small and medium vessel operators are 
calculable from the net economic return functions of equations (5) and (6). They should be 
equal to ∏(q)i
*=pi
*qi
*-C(qi
*). The actual estimations of net economic return in the current 
study are neglected because of the time constraint and the difficulty of getting information on 
operating costs. We therefore, assumed that the cost of operation between small, medium and 
large vessel are similar. In other words, we assume that the total cost for each type of vessel 
size is a constant, that is, not a function of catch and hence disappears with the first derivative 
of the net return with respect to catch.   
 
 
Collusive simultaneous strategy 
 
Our definition of collusive strategy refers to the equal sharing of output between the small 
and larger operators. As in the case of two players above the collusion means they come 
under one management and we are only interested in the evaluation of shared output and the 
impact it impinges on the economic returns of both parties. We also assume that the species 
of fish caught by small and medium vessel are homogeneous, that is, catches of these vessels 
are measured in terms of biomass body weight such as in metric tons. Hence, with this 
assumption collusion is possible because q1 is assumed to be equal to q2 and q=q1+q2. 
 
  R(q)1+ R(q)2  =  f1(q1, q2) q1   +  f2(q1, q2) q2                                                                           (9) 
 
           TR(q) =  ( 2 2 1 1 0 q q a a a + + )q1 + ( 2 2 1 1 0 q q b b b + + )q2 
 
  Since q1=q2 the quantity of small vessel can be replaced by the quantity of medium 
vessel and vice-versa in the above total revenue function yielding the following transformed 
total revenue TR(q1) if all q2 are replaced by q1 
  
∏ (q1)  = TR(q1) - 2C(q1)                                                                               (9.1) 
 
∏(q1)  =   ( 1 2 1 1 0 q q a a a + + )q1  + ( 1 2 1 1 0 q q b b b + + )q1 - 2C(q1)                   (9.2) 
 
The derivative of the above net economic return function with respect to q1 and setting the 
result equal to zero the optimal collusive quantity of small and medium are obtained (in the 
current analysis total cost are assumed to be a constant).  
 
   q 1
*  = q2
* =  
) ( 2 2 1 2 1
0 0
b b a a
b a
+ + +
+
                                                                (10) 
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These small and medium vessel catches represent the optimal quantities of collusive strategy 
and should be substituted into equations (1) and (2) respectively to get estimates their offered 
prices which can be subsequently be used to calculate net economic returns for the two 
fishing operators. 
 
 
Sequential strategy 
 
The sequential strategy utilizes the derived reaction functions of the competing firms, that is, 
the small and medium vessel operators as players in the game. These reaction functions for 
the current study are shown in equations (7) and (8).  Suppose the small vessel fishermen 
started first in the marketing of their catches that will be followed by the medium vessel 
fishermen, the first mover’s revenue function becomes 
 
  R(q)1 =  ( 2 2 1 1 0 q q a a a + + )q1                                                                                                       (11) 
 
 
Replacing q2 with its RHS identity and rearrange the parameters equation (11) becomes 
 
  R(q)1 =  
2
1
2
1 2
1
2
0 2 2
1 1 1 0 )
2
( )
2
( q q q q
b
b a
b
b a
a a - - -                                            (12) 
  ∏(q1)  = R(q1) - C(q1) =
2
1
2
1 2
1
2
0 2 2
1 1 1 0 )
2
( )
2
( q q q q
b
b a
b
b a
a a - - - −C(q1)      (13) 
 
 
Differentiating the net return equation above with respect to the quantity of catch of small  
fishermen q1 and setting the result to zero (again assumed total cost information is absent) we 
can obtain the quantity of output of small fishermen as the first mover which should be equal 
to  
 
   q1
#  =   )
2
( 2 / )
2
(
2
1 2
1
2
0 2
0 b
b a
a
b
b a
a - -                                                          (14.1) 
 
     q2
#  =  
#
1
2
1
2
0
2 2
q
b
b
b
b
-                                                                              (14.2) 
 
 
These optimal quantities of q1
# and q2
#   can be used to derive the net economic returns for the 
small size vessel as the first mover and medium size vessel fishermen as the follower after 
obtaining the efficient prices for the respective operators. Being the first mover we believe 
the small fishermen are able to benefit from a bigger market potential than the follower who 
will take to optimize his economic return for the remaining market. This means the follower 
is left with a smaller market to optimize his/her return therefore smaller chance of 
profitability.       
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DATA 
 
Data for this analysis was obtained from the Annual Fisheries Statistics 2004 published by 
the Department of Fisheries Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. Prices were reported at the ex shore, 
wholesale and retail levels and their trends were more or less fluctuated accordingly 
following the patterns set forth by the original shore prices. There were twenty six fish 
species selected for the analysis based on the extent of these species caught. We do believe 
that prices offered to the market follow the law of demand, that is, the more the species of 
fisheries caught the lower are their prices and vice-versa. Fish species that are scarcely caught 
will generally fetch better prices than those which are caught in plenty. Based on this 
assumption the relationship between price and quantity of fish caught is expected to be 
inversely related.  
 
The catch refers to twenty-six species of fish caught for the year 2004 and they are 
categorized in accordance with the small, medium and the large vessels. The average price 
for all species analyzed on shore is RM10.44 per kilogram, wholesale RM12.15 per kilogram 
and retail RM14.54 per kilogram.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section is divided into two parts. The first part presents results of the regression analyses 
using Shazam econometric package. The second part discusses the results of the simultaneous 
non-collusive and collusive games and the sequential strategies for deciding on a policy that 
should be most appropriate to improve the condition of for the small fishermen in relation to 
the medium and large fishermen.   
 
The results of regression analyses of the indirect demand functions for the catch of 
small vs. medium vessel and small vs. large vessel are presented in Table 1. A high 
correlation is expected between the prices at the three marketing levels; between ex shore, 
wholesale and retail prices. This is evidently true since individual fish prices tend to raise in 
proportion with the marketing levels to which they are sold, that is highest for the retail price 
and lowest for the ex shore price. High correlation between prices is indicated by the large t-
values of regression coefficients of the estimated regression equations. 
Note: Figures in parentheses denote t values, ***significant at 0.01 * significant at 0.10 & 
NS 
not significant. 
  Table 1: Results of the Regression Analyses for Small, Medium and Large Vessels of West Malaysia 2004 
      Ex  Wholesale  Retail  Small 
vessel 
Medium 
vessel 
large vessel       
  constant price (P1) Price 
 (P2) 
price  
(P3) 
catch  
(q1) 
Catch 
 (q2) 
Catch 
 (q3) 
     R
2  DW 
 
P1 
 
-0.65952 
   
0.91733 
   
-0.00082 
     
0.999 
 
1.734 
    (-7.900)
***      (218.0)
***     (-1.595)
NS             
P2 0.8448 1.086       -0.0003187   0.999 1.741 
     (8.918)
***   (203.9)
***           (-0.9609)
NS          
P1 -1.5567     0.83016 -0.0001278     0.998 1.753 
  (-10.580)
***       (124.8)
***  (-1.447)
NS          
P3 2.2496 1.1894         -9.038E-05 0.998 1.763 
  
 
   (12.060)
***   (115.8)
***            (-1.869)
*      IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Since quantity demanded is inversely associated with the price it therefore, follows 
the ordinary demand theory of normal goods. Here the quantity caught is assumed to be 
totally consumed and none of the production is used for export or consumed outside the 
country. The total quantity of consumption (qc) should be equal to the total production (qp) 
plus import (m) and minus export (x), that is q c= q p+m-x, since we do not have data on 
import and export directly related to this study the whole component of fish production is  
assumed to be consumed. With the exception of the quantity demanded (q2) and the 
wholesale price (P2) for medium vessel the t-values of the demand coefficients are somewhat 
significant at 90 percent probability level. The regression equations were estimated using 
Shazam auto command.   
 
 These estimated regression equations were used to calculate the reaction curves for 
the small vs. medium vessel and small vs. large vessel, quantity of catch sold to the market 
with the help of excel spread sheet. The results of the non-collusive linear interaction 
functions are shown below, 
 
p1 = 30.5428546 – 0.021700 q1
*– 0.007736q2
* 
p2 = 34.0143401 – 0.023566 q1 – 0.008430q2 
 
p1 = 24.6538254 – 0.010130 q1
*– 0.005951q3
* 
p3 = 31.5728599 – 0.012053 q1 – 0.007170q3     
 
 
The reaction curves for the non-collusive small vs. medium vessel and small vs. large vessel 
are as follows: 
 
q1 = 703.75888 – 0.1782495 q2 
q2 = 2016.7108 – 1.3972276 q1 
 
q1 = 1216.452473 – 0.29363271 q3 
q3 = 2202.176501 – 0.84066954 q1 
 
Using these reaction curves the non-collusive, collusive simultaneous and the sequential 
strategies of game theoretic optimal results for small vs. medium vessel and small vs. large 
vessel are derived and the results of these optimal payoffs are presented in Table 2. 
 
 The underlying reasons for choosing to present the results of game in tables instead of 
the normal payoff metric between players are: fist, there may be several criteria that we wish 
to consider in selecting a particular strategy relative to others. In the game theory players 
normally choose the equilibrium strategy that yields the best outcomes to both parties. 
Second, the decision to adopt a strategy with the highest return from the players’ standpoint 
may not serve to give the best return to the society’s welfare. The society’s welfare can be 
measured in terms of consumers’ surplus—the bigger the consumers’ surplus the better is the 
society. Third, if the criterion is based on the highest possible return to the economy such as 
its contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) then decision would most likely be 
different under these marketing systems of simultaneous (collusive and non-collusive 
strategies) and sequential strategy. Bearing in mind that the ultimate policy objective is to IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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help the small vessel size fishermen improve their livelihoods from fishing activities through 
choosing the appropriate marketing strategy.  
 
 If the final outcomes of the game in Table 2 were presented in payoff-metric one can 
easily spotlight the two potential equilibrium strategies that can help improve small fishermen 
incomes, that is collusive simultaneous strategy (RM7921.61, RM9037.94) and sequential 
strategy with F1’s as the first mover (RM5124.77, RM9444.29). The small vessel size 
fishermen expected profit’s share would be around 87.6 percent of the medium fishermen 
profit in simultaneous collusive strategy, and 54.3 percent in sequential F1’s first mover 
strategy. Apparently these results are also evident in Table 2 for the payoff-metric between 
small and large fishermen (RM9432.75, RM12953.32) and (RM6498.68, RM11309.41) for 
simultaneous collusive strategy and simultaneous F1’s as the first mover respectively. The 
corresponding profit’s shares of the small to large fishermen are 72.8 and 57.5 percent. 
 
Merger was found to be profitable depending on cost and the market structure 
(Steffen and Konrad 2001). Merger would benefit in terms of economic of scale, however, it 
should be aware that for every merger there is a possibility of blending the different levels of 
efficiency achieved by the merging firms. The larger firm with better profitability will have 
to sacrifice to smaller firm in terms of providing expertise and skills, sharing facilities for 
research and development, and perhaps training the new partner’s personnel to keep up with 
the dominant firm’s know how. Although it is possible for the smaller firm to excel in certain 
fields such as in management because of its small unit, generally the larger firm will have to 
bear the burden of merging. This is apparent from table whereby profits of medium and large 
firms have reduced significantly under collusion relative to their non-collusion condition.  
 
Steffen et al. (2001) also found that Stackelberg beats Cournot on collusion and 
efficiency in experimental markets in terms of higher outputs. Our results seem to mach that 
of Steffen and Normann (ex. q1=525.4 & q2=525.4 metric tons for Cournot versus q1= 685.96 
& q2 =1058.3 metric tons for the F1’s first mover Stackelberg) as shown in both of Table 2.  
Since we used profits as the final payoffs the large quantity of output will result in lower 
efficient price. The Stackelberg model is still superior to Cournot if F2’s is the first mover in 
the sequential strategy. For all model the Steckelberg sequential model is generally superior 
to Cournot in terms of society’s welfare since consumers’ surplus for this model is highest by 
virtue of its lowest efficient price compared to other models considered in this study. Since 
the demand function is linear we can easily estimate the value of the consumers’ surplus. The 
massage here is that if the society’s welfare--the consumers, is of paramount importance in 
policy formulation than the individual’s firm, the Steckelberg’s sequential model is most 
appropriate. The collusive strategy, in most cases tends to impose high efficient price because 
of the reduction in quantity demanded.  
 
Steffen and Konrad (2003) found that although merger “typically creates complex 
organizations, it has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing 
the number of competitors.” According to them horizontal merging is profitable and welfare 
improving if costs are linear. Moreover, merger is preferred because of the presumption that 
information and decision makings flow more freely and commitment is high within the 
merging firms.  
 
Finally, for a policy that favors the largest economic return to the economy as the 
ultimate goal we found the non-collusive simultaneous strategy is most appealing (Tables 2). 
Under competitive market the dominant firms are free to choose the level that suit them best IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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and the consideration for the smaller firms which are less dominant will have to bear the 
consequence of inefficiency in competition. Output ratio for the small to medium fisher is 
around 22.4 percent while their profit ratio is slightly lower, that is 19.4 percent. The same 
figures for small to large vessel fishermen were 48.3 percent and 33 percent for output and 
profit ratios respectively.     
 
 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper deals mainly with the parametric application of the game theory namely the non-
collusive, collusive simultaneous and the sequential strategies in the marketing of small, 
medium and large vessel fishermen’s outputs.  The results evidently support merger for the 
small fishermen because of the economic of scale and the level of efficiency between the 
merging firms are different. The possibility of blending different levels of efficiency achieved 
by the merging firms gives rise to the problem of adjustment. Merging benefits the smaller 
firm, in terms of the dominant firm’s know how--its expertise and skills, facilities for 
research and development, and perhaps training of the new partner’s personnel. There is a 
trade-off, in that the dominant firm’s profitability will be reduced while the small firm 
increases. Although merger typically creates complex organizations, it has profound effect 
besides reducing the number of competitors, merger is preferred because information and 
decision makings flow more freely and commitment is high within the merging firms.  
   
However, the Steckelberg sequential model is generally superior to the Cournot 
collusive strategy if the goal of the policy maker is to increase the society’s welfare since 
consumers’ surplus for this model is highest by virtue of its lowest efficient price. If the 
policy goal is to improve the small firm’s profitability then it would be more appropriate to 
concentrate on collusive simultaneous and sequential with F1’s (small firm) as the first 
mover. If the policy goal aims at the largest economic return to the economy then using linear 
models we found the non-collusive simultaneous strategy is most appealing.  
 
The present study assumes that fishermen market their daily catch without any 
strategic knowledge of game theory such that there is no association whatsoever between the 
way they market their catches and the profitability. It is further assumed that the market is 
constrained from inland fish suppliers and the market is completely dependent on local 
fishermen. Consumers would generally prefer fresh landings to the storage supplies of 
previous day catches. As the current economic model of game theory uses secondary data it 
would therefore be necessary to support these findings with empirical investigation using 
primary data and real world observations. Further study should be focused on the possibility 
of extending this steady-state to the intertemporal analytical framework.  
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  Table 2: Catch, Return and Price of Small, medium and Large Fishermen under Strategic Games in Marketing 
               West Malaysia 2004.      
  Non-
Collusive 
   Collusive     Sequential Strategy Non- 
Collusive 
   Collusive     Sequential Strategy 
 
   Simultaneous  Simultaneous 
Small 
Fishermen 
Medium 
Fishermen  Simultaneous  Simultaneous 
Small 
Fishermen 
large 
Fishermen 
         First Mover  First Mover        First Mover  First Mover 
Catch of small                         
     vessel Q1 ( t)  344.3  525.4  685.9  336.7  756.6  796.3  1125.5  532.4 
Catch of medium                         
     vessel Q2 ( t)  1535.7  525.4  1058.3  2059.0             
Catch of Large                         
     vessel Q3 ( t)              1566.1  796.3  1,256.0  2,329.70 
Ex price of                         
     small fisher P1                         
     (RMy per kg)  11.19  15.08  7.47  7.31  7.67  11.85  5.77  5.39 
Wholesale price of                         
     medium fisher P2                      
     (RMy per kg)  12.95  17.2  8.92  8.71             
Retail price of                         
     large fisher P3                         
     (RMy per kg)              11.23  16.27  9.00  8.46 
Return of small                         
     fisher π1 (RMy)  3,853.24  7,921.61  5,124.77  2,460.63  5,800.58  9,432.75  6,498.68  2,872.04 
Return of medium                         
     fisher π2 (RMy)  19,887.73  9,037.94  9,444.29  17,943.89             
Return of large                         
     fisher π3 (RMy)              17,583.00  12,953.32  11,309.41  19,699.15 
     Q1/Q2  0.224  1.000  0.648  0.164             
     Q1/Q3              0.483  1.000  0.896  0.229 
     π1/π2  0.194  0.876  0.543  0.137             
     π1/π3         0.33  0.728  0.575  0.146 
 